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Criminal Solicitation, Entrapment,
and the Enforcement of Law
1. Introduction
Law enforcers often solicit individuals to commit criminal acts as a way of
lowering the cost of apprehending and convicting offenders. Examples include the use of
undercover cops to apprehend drug dealers and prostitutes, or their customers. The
presumption underlying the use of this strategy is that the target of the solicitation has a
predisposition to commit the crime in question and therefore will likely commit an actual
crime if not first apprehended by the police sting. Further, the increased threat of capture
may deter some potential offenders from committing crimes in the first place. This logic
suggests that criminal solicitation can be an effective tool in the arsenal of law enforcers.
The principal objection to solicitation, of course, is that it may induce a criminal
act by someone who otherwise had no intention of breaking the law. This is the sort of
person that the entrapment defense is meant to protect. Specifically, entrapment is the
unlawful arrest of a person who was not “predisposed” to commit the crime in question
(Posner, 2003, p. 231; Shavell, 2004, pp. 564-565). It is therefore aimed at protecting
innocent people from overzealousness on the part of law enforcers.1
The purpose of this paper is to incorporate the use of criminal solicitation into the
standard economic model of law enforcement (Polinsky and Shavell, 2000). The goals of
the analysis are twofold. The first is to characterize the optimal use of solicitation as part
of an overall enforcement strategy. This involves amending the standard model to allow
search by potential offenders for “criminal opportunities,” some of which may represent
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“stings” by law enforcers. For example, a drug dealer searches for buyers, knowing that
some are undercover cops. We characterize two types of social benefits as arising from
the use of this strategy: the first is a deterrence effect, which is due to the lower crime
rate as some offenders are deterred from committing any crimes by the higher expected
probability of apprehension; and the second is a diversion effect, which is the savings in
social harm and enforcement costs as some offenders are diverted away from committing
actual crimes through solicitation. At the optimum, these benefits are weighed against
the marginal enforcement cost (the cost of the last undercover cop hired) plus the
increased punishment cost (in the case of jail) due to the greater certainty of
apprehension.
The second goal of the analysis is to examine the economic justification for, and
impact of, the entrapment defense. We argue that, within the context of the model, two
types of defendants can claim entrapment: those who would have refrained from seeking
criminal opportunities altogether if not for the solicitation, and those who were actively
seeking criminal opportunities but would not have found one but for the solicitation.
Although the first type of offender has a legitimate claim from a legal perspective (given
the above definition of entrapment), we show that such a claim is not justified by the
model—i.e., any offender who would have been deterred in the absence of solicitation
would be deterred a fortiori in its presence (all else equal). (This follow immediately
from the deterrence effect described above.) Conversely, while some active searchers
may legitimately claim that they would have failed to locate a criminal opportunity if not
for solicitation (because solicitation increases the probability of success, by design), this
1

Entrapments do not necessarily imply corrupt police officers, however, in that there is no necessary intent
to falsely arrest someone (Stevenson, 2004). This is what distinguishes entrapment from “framing”
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is not a good legal (or economic) defense against prosecution because the very act of
searching for an opportunity to commit a crime imposes an expected cost on society.
Although the model fails to explain why some truly innocent individuals are
caught in police stings, we introduce that possibility into the model and examine the
implications for the optimal use of solicitation. Not surprisingly, the possibility of false
arrest reduces the desirability of this strategy by diluting its deterrence benefits and by
creating a cost of wrongful punishment. The entrapment defense, to the extent that it
mitigates the risk of false arrest, therefore actually promotes the use of criminal
solicitation as an enforcement strategy.
2. The Model
The model differs from the standard economic model of crime in that it assumes
potential offenders must search for criminal opportunities, and that, in a given time
period, they may or may not be successful in locating one. In this context, the goal of
criminal solicitation by law enforcers (“sting” operations) is to create what appear to be
criminal opportunities (e.g., an undercover cop offering to buy drugs) as a way of
diverting offenders from actual opportunities, thereby avoiding the social harm from the
crime and saving on the costs of apprehension. To capture this formally, suppose that in
the absence of solicitation there are n potential criminal opportunities available to
offenders seeking to commit an offense, and x of these represent actual opportunities,
where x≤n.2 For example, the n opportunities might represent locations where drug
dealers are known to hang out, and on a give night there is an actual dealer at x of those

innocent people. On the latter activity, see Polinsky and Shavell (2001).
2
The reason for allowing x<n will become apparent in the discussion of the entrapment defense in Section
5 below.
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locations. Thus, a person who visits one of those n locations at random in hopes of
buying drugs will be successful with probability x/n.
Now suppose that the police create y new opportunities, for example by
disguising undercover cops as drug dealers. This makes the total number of potential
criminal opportunities n+y, and the number of actual opportunities (including stings)
x+y. As a result, the probability that a potential buyer will succeed in locating an actual
opportunity (a willing dealer) is now (x+y)/(n+y), and the probability that he will fail is
(n−x)/(n+y). If the buyer succeeds in locating a dealer, the conditional probability that it
is a sting is y/(x+y), in which case the buyer is apprehended and punished with certainty.
In contrast, the conditional probability that it is an actual dealer is x/(x+y), in which case
the offender commits the crime and is only later caught and punished with probability
p<1. This situation is depicted schematically in Figure 1.
The model makes use of the following additional notation:
s = dollar value of the sanction (fine or prison) imposed on the offender if
caught;3
k(s) = social cost of punishment if it is prison, k'>0, k"<0;
e(y) = cost of a sting operation, e'>0, e"<0;
c(p) = cost of apprehension if the offender commits an actual crime, c'>0, c"<0;
h = social harm from an actual criminal act;4
g = dollar gain to offender from committing an actual criminal act;5
f(g), F(g) = density and distribution functions for g (where f≡F').

3

We assume that the punishment is the same whether or not the offender is caught in a sting.
We assume no harm is incurred when an offender is caught in a sting.
5
We also assume that the offender obtains no gain if he is caught in a sting.
4

4

Figure 2 depicts the sequence of decisions of a potential offender, and shows the
resulting payoffs to the offender (O) and society (S). The offender first draws a g from
the distribution F(g) and compares the realized value to the threshold level ĝ (to be

derived below). If g< ĝ , the offender is deterred and the game ends. However, if g≥ ĝ ,
he searches for a criminal opportunity.6 As noted above, he succeeds in locating one with
probability (x+y)/(n+y), and fails with probability (n−x)/(n+y). If he fails, the game
ends, but if he succeeds, he is either caught immediately in a sting (which occurs with
conditional probability y/(x+y)) and incurs punishment of s, or he commits an actual
crime (which occurs with conditional probability x/(x+y)) and receives an expected
payoff of g−ps.7
As for the social payoffs, note first that society incurs the cost of a sting
operation, e(y), in all states of the world because the cost of setting up a sting (i.e., of
deploying undercover cops) is independent of the offender’s behavior (and hence
independent of the realized value of g). In the case where punishment is jail time, the
punishment cost, k(s), is incurred with certainty if the offender is caught in a sting, and
with probability p if he commits an actual crime. In contrast, the cost of apprehension,
c(p), is only incurred if the offender commits an actual crime because only in that state do
the police need to invest resources to capture him. Note that this specification is
something of a departure from the standard economic model of crime in that it treats c(p)
as a variable cost rather than a fixed cost that is incurred regardless of the crime rate. In
reality, of course, some apprehension costs are fixed (e.g., police salaries) and some are
variable (detection efforts). We assume here that all costs are of the latter type because,
6

We assume that the search is costless, though a cost could be added without altering the basic results.
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as noted above, one of the main benefits of criminal solicitation is to save on
apprehension costs.8 Finally, the social harm from an offense, h, is only incurred when
the offender commits an actual crime.
Note that the offender’s gain, g, is not counted as part of the social return in
Figure 2. This is also a departure from the standard model and reflects an implicit
assumption that the act being considered is strictly undesirable from a social perspective.9
This specification is based on the idea that the use of solicitations as an enforcement
strategy is limited to acts that society definitely wants to deter. However, we show in
Section 4.3 that our basic results do not depend on this assumption, suggesting that
solicitation may be useful in a wider range of law enforcement settings.
3. The Offender’s Optimal Behavior

Consider first the optimal behavior of a potential offender. Note that the only
choice the offender makes is whether or not to seek a criminal opportunity once he has
observed g. To examine this choice, we therefore need to calculate the threshold value ĝ .
Based on the various possible outcomes in Figure 2 and the associated probabilities, we
can calculate the offender’s expected return from seeking a criminal opportunity, once he
has observed g, to be10
 x

n+


 y 
( g − ps) − 
 s .
y
n+ y

7

(1)

Note that the current model collapses to the standard model in the case where y=0 and x=n.
In fact, Becker’s (1968) original paper specified apprehension costs as a positive function of both p and
the crime rate, or number of offenses, O. That is, he wrote the cost of apprehension as c(p,O), where cp>0
and cO>0. Since then, however, most models have abandoned this dependence and simply written c(p).
9
See the general discussion of this point in Polinsky and Shavell (2000, p. 48, especially at note 12).
10
Note that the unconditional probability of locating an actual opportunity (given search) is
[(x+y)/(n+y)][x/(n+y)]=x/(n+y), while the unconditional probability of being caught in a sting is
[(x+y)/(n+y)][y/(n+y)]=y/(n+y).
8
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The offender will seek an opportunity if and only if this return is positive, or if and only
if
g ≥ (p + y/x)s ≡ ĝ .

(2)

It follows immediately from this condition that use of criminal solicitation as an
enforcement strategy increases deterrence, all else equal (i.e., ∂ ĝ /∂y>0). This is due to
the increased probability that the offender will be apprehended, conditional on his
locating a criminal opportunity, as y increases.
4. Socially Optimal Solicitation

This section derives the socially optimal level of criminal solicitation, taking as
given the optimal behavior of offenders. We first consider the case where s is a fine and
later consider the case where it is jail time.
4.1. Optimal Solicitation when Punishment is a Fine
In the case where punishment is a fine, there is no social cost of punishment; that
is k(s)≡0. Combining the social costs of the various outcomes in Figure 2 with the
relevant probabilities yields expected social costs of
∞

x
SC =
[h + c( p)]dF ( g ) + e( y ) ,
n + y ∫gˆ

(3)

where ĝ is defined by (2). The social problem is the choose y, p, and s to minimize these
costs.
Consider first the optimal level of solicitation, denoted y*. Taking the derivative
of (3) with respect to y yields the first-order condition
x
x
[h + c( p )] f ( gˆ )( s / x) +
[1 − F ( gˆ )][h + c( p )] = e′.
n+ y
(n + y ) 2
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(4)

The two terms on the left-hand side of (4) reflect the marginal benefit of solicitation. The
first term is the marginal benefit due to increased deterrence of crime as y increases (the
deterrence effect), while the second term is the expected savings in social harm and
variable apprehension costs as some offenders are solicited to commit a crime by the
police rather than committing an actual crime (the diversion effect). At the optimum,
these marginal benefits are equated to the marginal cost of solicitation.
Consider next the optimal apprehension rate for those offenders who commit
actual crimes. Taking the derivative of (3) with respect to p (and rearranging) yields the
first-order condition
[h + c( p )] f ( gˆ ) s = [1 − F ( gˆ )]c ′ .

(5)

This says that the marginal benefit of the greater deterrence from increased p should be
equated to the expected marginal cost. Given this condition, it is interesting to ask how
use of solicitation affects the optimal apprehension rate. That is, are y and p
complements or substitutes? Differentiating (5) with respect to p and y (and assuming
that f'≈0)11 shows that ∂y/∂p>0. That is, the optimal apprehension rate goes up as y is
increased, implying that when solicitation is used as a part of an enforcement strategy, the
police should pursue those who commit actual crimes more aggressively. Intuitively,
since solicitation deters some crimes, it lowers the expected marginal cost of
apprehension (by lowering the crime rate), thereby increasing the optimal p.
Finally, consider the optimal fine. As in standard enforcement models, the fine
should be maximal (i.e., equal to the offender’s wealth, w) because it is costless to
increase the fine. As usual, this is proved by assuming that s is less than maximal. Then,

11

This amounts to assuming that f is uniform (or nearly so).
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s can be raised and p lowered while holding y fixed so that ĝ is unchanged. But since this
causes social costs to fall, the original s could not have been optimal. Thus, s*=w.
4.2. Optimal Solicitation when Punishment is Jail Time
When punishment takes the form of jail time, k(s)>0, and social costs become
∞

SC =

1
[ x(h + c( p)) + ( xp + y )k ( s )]dF ( g ) + e( y ) ,
n + y ∫gˆ

(6)

where ĝ continues to be given by (2) (with s now interpreted as the dollar cost to the
offender of jail time). Optimal solicitation in this case is found by minimizing this
expression with respect to y. The relevant first-order condition is
1
1
[ x(h + c( p )) + ( xp + y )k ( s )] f ( gˆ )( s / x) +
[1 − F ( gˆ )][ x(h + c( p)) + ( xp + y )k ( s )]
n+ y
n+ y
=

1
[1 − F ( gˆ )]k ( s ) + e′ .
n+ y

(7)

The two terms on the left-hand side again represent the marginal benefit of solicitation in
the form of the deterrence and diversion effects, respectively. The only difference
compared to the previous case is that these benefits now include the saved punishment
costs for those crimes that are deterred. Offsetting this is the fact that the marginal cost
of solicitation now also includes an extra term for the marginal punishment costs for
those offenders who are caught by the sting. Since the net effect of introducing
punishment costs is ambiguous, y may be higher or lower here compared to the case
where punishment is a fine.
The optimal choice of p in this case solves the first-order condition
[x(h+c(p)) + (xp+y)k(s)]f( ĝ )s = [1−F( ĝ )]x(c'+k(s)),
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(8)

which has the same interpretation as (5), except for the addition of k(s) on both sides.
Finally, the optimal prison term solves the first-order condition
[x(h+c(p)) + (xp+y)k(s)]f( ĝ )[p+(y/x)] = [1−F( ĝ )](xp+y)k'.

(9)

In contrast to the fine, the optimal prison term is not necessarily maximal but instead
balances the marginal benefits from increased deterrence (the left-hand side) against the
marginal cost of punishment (the right-hand side).12
4.3. Offender’s Benefit Counts in Social Welfare
We conclude this section by asking whether the preceding results would be
qualitatively different if the offender’s benefit were counted in social welfare. (For
simplicity, we limit the analysis to the case of fines.) Social welfare in this case is
written
SW =

∞

x
[ g − h − c( p )]dF ( g ) − e( y ) .
n + y ∫gˆ

(10)

Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to y (and assuming an interior
solution) yields
∞

x
−x
[ gˆ − h − c( p)] f ( gˆ )( s / x) −
[ g − h − c( p )]dF ( g ) = e′ .
n+ y
(n + y ) 2 ∫gˆ

(11)

Note that the left-hand side of this condition, which is the marginal benefit of solicitation
(again reflecting the deterrence and diversion effects) must be positive. A necessary
condition for this to be true is
gˆ < h + c( p) .

12

(12)

This result is in contrast to that in Polinsky and Shavell (2000, p. 54), which showed that when
punishment is exclusively jail time and p is endogenous, the optimal jail term is maximal. The same result
would hold here if y=0 and k"=0.
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Thus, there is some degree of underdeterrence. This is a standard result, reflecting the
fact that deterrence is costly, so crimes are optimally deterred only to the point where the
last dollar spent on enforcement (in this case, on y) equals the net social loss from the
marginal crime (given by h+c(p)− ĝ ). Generally, therefore, there will be less deterrence
(and therefore less criminal solicitation) in a model that values the offender’s gain
compared to one that does not.
5. Application to the Entrapment Defense

Entrapment is a defense that can be raised by a criminal defendant who claims
that the solicitation caused him to commit a crime that he otherwise would not have
committed. In the context of the model, there are two possible justifications for such a
claim (refer to Figure 2). First, the offender could argue that he would have been
deterred from seeking a criminal opportunity if not for the solicitation. That is, although
g≥ ĝ when y>0, it would have been the case that g < ĝ if y=0 (given g and ĝ ). Such an
argument, however, is not supported by the model. To see why, recall that ĝ is
increasing in y from (2), implying that if the offender would have been deterred from
seeking a criminal opportunity if y=0, then he would have been deterred a fortiori when
y>0. Thus, in the context of the current model, at least, this basis for entrapment cannot
be true.
The second possible basis for an entrapment defense is that an offender caught in
a sting could argue that, although he was seeking a criminal opportunity (i.e., although
g≥ ĝ ), he would not have found one but for the solicitation. To evaluate this claim, recall
that the probability of locating a criminal opportunity, conditional on searching, is given
by (x+y)/(n+y), which is increasing in y (given n>x). Thus, the general strategy of
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criminal solicitation (y>0) does increase the likelihood that an offender will commit a
crime of some sort. However, this is a weak argument on the defendant’s part because,
once he has decided to seek an opportunity, he imposes an expected cost on society given
that his failure to commit a crime is only due to his failure to locate an opportunity.
Based on this logic, it is perfectly legitimate (in an economic sense) for enforcers to use
any reasonable enforcement strategy to reduce those costs.
In fact, the generally accepted definition of entrapment would seem to limit its
applicability to the first situation, in which the solicitation induces someone to commit a
crime that he never would have committed in “his ordinary environment” (Posner, 2003,
p. 231). Individuals seeking a criminal opportunity (those for whom g≥ ĝ ) clearly do not
fit this definition. (Although they failed to commit a crime, they had criminal intent, or
mens rea.) As we saw above, however, individuals who are deterred from even seeking
opportunities (those for whom g< ĝ ) are never caught in a sting. Thus, the current model
does not capture the paradigmatic case of entrapment, which would seem to require some
sort of “excessive” enforcement effort by the police, as might arise, for example, if some
officers were corrupt or were pursuing an objective other than social welfare.
Incorporating such factors into the model is beyond the scope of this paper.13
5.1. The Impact of Entrapment on Law Enforcement
Although the model sheds no light on why or how some innocent individuals are
caught in a sting, it can nevertheless be used to examine the implications of false arrests,

13

There is a large literature on police corruption. See, for example, Becker and Stigler (1974), Mookherjee
and Png (1995), Polinsky and Shavell (2001), and Garoupa and Klerman (2004). On the specific
relationship between entrapment and police misconduct, see Stevenson (2004), who argues that a newer
approach to defining entrapment is based on the behavior of the police rather than the disposition of the
offender. Specifically, if the police engage in some form of misconduct, the arrest is deemed to be
entrapment regardless of the offender’s proclivity.
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or “entrapments,” on the desirability of sting operations, assuming that such arrests occur
with some known frequency. To do this, suppose that a person who chooses not to seek a
criminal opportunity will be caught in a sting with a positive probability, which is
positively related to the probability that a person actively seeking a criminal opportunity
is caught in a sting, y/(n+y).14 Specifically, let the probability that an innocent person is
falsely arrested be
 y 
 ,
q(y,θ) = θ 
n+ y

(13)

where 0<θ<1 and ∂q/∂y>0. Thus, increased use of solicitation increases the probability
of false arrests, though at a slower rate than it increases the probability of catching an
actual offender.
Consider first how the possibility of false arrest affects the incentives of potential
offenders to seek criminal opportunities. After realizing g, if an individual seeks an
offense, his expected return is given by (1), whereas if he does not, his expected return is
−q(y,θ)s. He will therefore commit the act if and only if the former exceeds the latter, or
if and only if
g ≥ [p + (y/x)(1−θ)]s ≡ gˆ (θ ) .

(14)

It is clear from a comparison of (2) and (14) that the possibility of false arrest (i.e., θ>0)
reduces deterrence compared to the case where false arrest is not possible. Intuitively,
the possibility of false arrest imposes a cost on the innocent, thereby increasing the
incremental value of seeking criminal opportunities.

14

This specification follows that in Polinsky and Shavell (2001, p. 5) regarding the probability that an
innocent person will be framed by a corrupt police officer.
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In addition to affecting the crime rate, we assume that false arrest entails a social
cost associated with wrongful punishment.15 Let r(s) be the social cost of imposing a
punishment of severity s on an innocent individual, where r'>0. Thus, the expected social
cost of wrongful punishment is equal to
F ( gˆ (θ ))q( y,θ )r ( s ) ,

(15)

where F ( gˆ (θ )) is the fraction of innocent individuals (i.e., those who choose not to seek
criminal opportunities). Note that (15) excludes the cost of punishing those individuals
who chose to seek a criminal opportunity but failed to locate one (an event that occurs
with probability [1−F( gˆ (θ ) ][(n−x)/(n+y)]). Although these individuals are, strictly
speaking, innocent of a crime, as noted above, it is debatable whether or not these
apprehensions constitute entrapment. For simplicity, we exclude them here.
Adding the term in (15) to social costs in (3) yields the new expression for social
costs:16
∞

SC' =

x
[h + c( p)]dF ( g ) + F ( gˆ (θ ))q( y,θ )r ( s ) + e( y ) .
n + y gˆ ∫(θ )

(16)

Consider first optimal solicitation. Taking the derivative of (16) with respect to y
and equating it to zero yields
x
x
 (1 − θ ) s 
[1 − F ( gˆ (θ ))][h + c( p )]
[h + c( p )] f ( gˆ (θ ))
+
2
n+ y
 x  (n + y )

=

(1 − θ ) s
θn
f ( gˆ (θ ))q( y,θ )r ( s ) +
F ( gˆ (θ ))r ( s ) + e′ .
x
(n + y ) 2

15

(17)

Harris (1970) was apparently the first to introduce this factor into the economic model of crime. Also see
Miceli (1991).
16
We restrict the analysis in this section to punishment by a fine. Extension to the case of jail is
straightforward.
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Comparing this condition to (4), we first note that the possibility of false arrests (θ>0) has
an ambiguous effect on the marginal benefit of solicitation (the terms in the first line of
(17)). On one hand, it lowers the marginal benefit of solicitation by reducing deterrence
(the first term), but on the other, it results in greater savings in social harm and
enforcement costs because the crime rate is higher (the second term). In contrast, false
arrest increases the marginal cost of solicitation by increasing the expected cost of
wrongful punishment. This is reflected by the first two terms on the right-hand side of
(17). The first term captures the higher expected error costs due to the decreasing crime
rate as y is raised (which means that there are more innocent people who can be wrongly
punished), while the second captures the increasing error cost due to the higher arrest
rate. On balance, it would seem that the combined effects will cause the optimal use of
solicitation to decrease when the possibility of false arrest is taken into account.
Next consider the optimal choice of p. The relevant first-order condition is given
by
x
x
[h + c( p )] f ( gˆ (θ )) s =
[1 − F ( gˆ (θ ))]c ′ + f ( gˆ (θ ))q ( y, θ )r ( s ) s .
n+ y
n+ y

(18)

This differs from condition (5) in two ways. First, the crime rate here is lower due to the
diminished deterrence, which lowers the marginal cost of raising p (the first term on the
right-hand side). However, this is offset by the extra term on the right-hand side, which
is the marginal increase in the probability of wrongful punishment as p is raised because
of the deterrence effect (i.e., there are more innocent people who can be falsely arrested).
The net effect on p is therefore ambiguous.

15

Finally, consider the optimal punishment (fine). In contrast to the earlier analysis
with no risk of wrongful punishment, the optimal fine here is no longer necessarily
maximal. Instead, it is the solution to the following condition
x
[h + c( p )] f ( gˆ (θ ))[ p + ( y / x)(1 − θ )]
n+ y
= f ( gˆ (θ ))q ( y, θ )r ( s )[ p + ( y / x)(1 − θ ] + F ( gˆ (θ ))q ( y, θ )r ′ . (19)

The right-hand side of this equation reflects the marginal costs associated with raising the
fine. The first term is the marginal increase in error costs as the crime rate decreases,
thus subjecting more innocent people to the possibility of wrongful punishment, and the
second term is the increase in error costs due to the increasing severity of the sanction,
holding the crime rate fixed.
The entrapment defense, if effective in overturning the arrest of truly innocent
suspects, has the effect of lowering θ. The preceding results therefore suggest that the
defense has the effect of increasing the use of criminal solicitation, and of increasing the
severity of criminal punishments of those who are convicted. The effect on the optimal
apprehension rate, however, is ambiguous.
6. Conclusion

This paper has shown that criminal solicitation, or the tempting of individuals to
commit criminal acts by police deception, can be a useful component of an overall law
enforcement strategy. Solicitation provides the dual benefits of deterring some offenders
from committing crimes altogether (because they anticipate the higher probability that
they will be caught), and of diverting others from committing actual crimes that would
have imposed harm on victims and necessitated the expenditure of substantial resources
on apprehension. The primary drawback of solicitation is the risk that it may “entrap”
16

individuals who otherwise would not have committed a crime. By invalidating such false
arrests, the entrapment defense therefore provides an important safeguard against
excessive use of solicitation by the police.
As noted, a finding of entrapment has traditionally depended on whether or not
the defendant had a predisposition to commit the crime for which he was arrested. In a
recent article, however, Stevenson (2004) notes that courts are increasingly defining
entrapment based on the behavior of the police. Specifically, evidence of police
misconduct or overzealousness would result in a finding of entrapment, regardless of the
defendant’s intentions. This new standard is more compatible with economic theory
because it depends on the observable actions of the police rather than the unobservable
state of mind of the defendant.17 Moreover, the analysis in the current paper provides an
economic basis for applying the new standard by defining an optimal level of solicitation,
y*, against which actual police behavior can be compared. Specifically, entrapment
occurs if and only if y>y*. Although it may be a difficult task to compute y* for
purposes of applying this test, it will almost certainly be easier than attempting to inquire
into the defendant’s state of mind.

17

For this reason, Stevenson (2004) refers to the old standard as a “subjective test” and the new standard as
an “objective test.”

17

References

Becker, G. (1968) “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” Journal of
Political Economy 76: 169-217.
Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974) “Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of
Enforcers,” Journal of Legal Studies 3: 1-18.
Garoupa, N. and D. Klerman (2004) “Corruption and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary
Sanctions,” International Review of Law and Economics 24: 219-225.
Harris, J. (1970) “On the Economics of Law and Order,” Journal of Political Economy
78: 165-174.
Miceli, T. (1991) “Optimal Criminal Procedure: Fairness and Deterrence,” International
Review of Law and Economics 11: 3-10.
Mookherjee, D. and I. Png (1995) “Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They be
Compensated?” Economic Journal 105: 145-159.
Posner, R. (2003) Economic Analysis of Law, 6th Edition, New York: Aspen Publishers.
Polinsky, A. M. and S. Shavell (2000) “The Economic Theory of Public Law
Enforcement,” Journal of Economic Literature 38: 45-76.
___________ (2001) “Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement,” Journal of Public
Economics 81: 1-24.
Shavell, S. (2004) Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law, Cambridge, MA: Belknap
Press of Harvard Univ. Press.
Stevenson, D. (2004) “Entrapment and the Problem of Deterring Police Misconduct,”
Connecticut Law Review 37: 67-153.

18

n−x

potential criminal
opportunities

x

actual criminal
opportunities

y

stings

Figure 1. Schematic depiction of a potential offender’s criminal opportunities.
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